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Abstract—This paper proposes KISS, a novel Internet classi-
fication engine. Motivated by the expected raise of UDP traffic,
which stems from the momentum of P2P streaming applications,
we propose a novel classification framework which leverages on
statistical characterization of payload.
Statistical signatures are derived by the means of a Chi-Square
like test, which extracts the protocol “format”, but ignores the
protocol “semantic” and “synchronization” rules. The signatures
feed a decision process based either on the geometric distance
among samples, or on Support Vector Machines. KISS is very
accurate, and its signatures are intrinsically robust to packet
sampling, reordering, and flow asymmetry, so that it can be used
on almost any network.
KISS is tested in different scenarios, considering traditional
client-server protocols, VoIP and both traditional and new P2P
Internet applications. Results are astonishing. The average True
Positive percentage is 99.6%, with the worst case equal 98.1,%
while results are almost perfect when dealing with new P2P
streaming applications.
Index Terms—Traffic classification, Supervised learning algo-
rithms
I. INTRODUCTION
Last years witnessed a very fast-paced deployment of new
Internet applications, ignited by the introduction of the suc-
cessful Peer-to-Peer (P2P) paradigm and fueled by the growth
of Internet access rates. This entailed not only a deep change
of the Internet application landscape, but also undermined
the reliability of the traditional Internet traffic classification
mechanisms, typically based on Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
as for instance simple port-based classification.
As such, research on Internet traffic classification has gained
significant attention, with a large number of proposals (see
Sec. VI for an overview) that try to circumvent DPI limi-
tations. Indeed, DPI is deemed to fail more and more due
to: i) proliferation of proprietary and evolving protocols, ii)
embracement of strong encryption techniques and iii) adoption
of tunneling techniques [1], [2]. In previous proposals, UDP
has usually been neglected in favor of applications running
over TCP. Motivated by the raise of UDP traffic volume, which
stems from the momentum of VoIP, streaming and P2P-TV
applications that deeply rely on UDP at the transport layer,
we propose a novel classification framework that explicitly
targets long-lived UDP traffic flows.
This work was funded by the European Commission under the 7th Frame-
work Programme Strep Project “NAPA-WINE” (Network Aware Peer-to-Peer
Application under WIse Network) and by a Cisco Collaborative Research
Initiative (CCRI) named “Protocol Oblivious (Behavioral) Internet Traffic
Classification”. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [3].
The mechanism we propose is based on the idea of au-
tomatically identifying the application protocol “format”, by
means of a statistical packet inspection. This already proved
successful in assisting the identification of particularly tricky
traffic such as the one generated by Skype [2]. In this paper,
we push this intuition further, arguing that, due to the con-
nectionless service of UDP, the very first bytes of the UDP
payload of traffic streams are likely to carry some applica-
tion layer protocol (L7-protocol), in which constant values,
counters, random identifiers, etc., can be found. Recalling that
a protocol specifies the rules governing the format, semantics
and synchronization of a communication, we propose to extract
the L7-protocol format while ignoring the actual semantic
and synchronization rules. This is achieved by statistically
characterizing the frequencies of observed values in the UDP
payload, by performing a test similar to the Pearson’s χ2 test.
The results of the test are then used to compactly represent
application fingerprints, which we call Chi-Square Signatures
(pronounced as KISS).
While KISS fingerprints stem from packet inspection, they
have several advantages over classical DPI signatures:
• They can be automatically derived, i.e., no cumbersome
and tedious reverse engineering is required;
• They can be quickly updated, so that they are well apt to
the context of fast-evolving Internet applications;
• They are easily portable across different network settings,
since fingerprints depend solely on the L7-protocol for-
mat;
• They are robust to routing asymmetry, packet loss or
sampling, retransmission, or any possible strange packet
arrival pattern, since they are build over a statistical
characterization of protocol format rather than over a
deterministic description;
• They are suitable to both per-flow and per-endpoint
classification;
• Their computational and memory requirements are very
limited, so that they are suitable for on-line classification.
However, KISS shares with DPI classifier the need to look
at application layer messages. As a drawback, in case of
encrypted payload, both approaches become ineffective.
After that fingerprints have been extracted, proper classi-
fication must be achieved, i.e., individual items should be
placed into the most likely class. A huge set of methodolo-
gies are available from the literature, from simple threshold
based heuristics [4], to Naive Bayesian classifiers [2], [5], to
2advanced statistical classification techniques [6]. In this paper,
we compare a simple geometric decision process based on
Euclidean distance with Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [6],
which are well known in the statistical classification field, but
have been rarely exploited in the context of Internet traffic
classification.
To prove the performance of the proposed framework, we
implemented KISS in Tstat [7], which then we use to derive
the results presented in this paper. We test KISS on both
testbed and real traffic traces, collected from an operative
ISP network classifying traditional protocols (like DNS and
RTP traffic), affirmed P2P protocols (like eMule, BitTorrent
and Skype) and emerging P2P-TV applications (like PPLive,
SopCast, Joost, TVants). KISS exhibits excellent performance,
typically achieving more than 98.1% of True Positives when
SVM is adopted. These astonishing results are due to both
the accurate characterization of the KISS signatures and the
precise classification of the SVMs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
introduces general concepts and specify the metrics chosen
to evaluate KISS performance. Sec. III describes the KISS
architecture, detailing both feature extraction and decision
processes. Sec. IV describes the set of traces used in the
experiments and Sec. V reports a deep investigation of KISS,
testing its performance and parameters in many different
scenarios. An overview of other classification techniques is
presented in Sec.VI while Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Before entering into the details of KISS, we briefly summa-
rize the key ideas behind classification tools and the method-
ologies to test them and evaluate their performance.
A. Classifiers
Classifiers are defined by two main processes (see [6], [8]
for a more extended description):
• Feature extraction: the process of extracting the subset
of information that summarizes a large set of data, or
samples.
• Decision process: the algorithm that assigns a suitable
class to an observed sample.
Examples of features are specific strings in the payload
(as in DPI), or packet size, or amount of exchanged bytes.
Potentially, any summary of a packet stream can be used and
its choice has a deep impact on the classifier performance. In
our tool, features are defined from the statistical observation
of the values taken by portions of the payload.
For the decision process, any machine learning technique
can be adopted; in this paper we focus on supervised learning
algorithms [6], in which a training set composed of known
traffic is used to build a model; the model is then used during
the classification task. Given a geometric representation of
features in a multidimensional space, during the training phase,
labeled samples are used to identify and to define the “volume”
in which samples of the considered class fall into. During the
classification process instead, the sample to be classified has to
be labeled with the most likely class according to the volume it
TABLE I
DEFINITION OF FALSE/TRUE POSITIVE AND FALSE/TRUE NEGATIVE
Oracle Classification
True False
Classification
Result
Positive True Positive False Positive
Negative False Negative True Negative
falls into. For example, assuming that there are two classes of
objects, i.e., red and yellow apples, if the features of a sample
place it in an volume dense of red apples, we are inclined to
classify it as a red apple too. However, defining the surface
that delimits the volumes (to later take the decision) is tricky,
since training points can be spread out on the multidimensional
space and complex surfaces must be described. In this paper,
we consider both simple geometric decision process and SVM
based algorithm, which is considered to be among the most
powerful supervised learning algorithms.
B. Testing methodology
Once a classifier has been designed, its performance must be
evaluated and proper metrics must be defined. Assessing the
performance of Internet traffic classifiers is not a trivial task
due to the difficulty in knowing the “ground truth”, i.e., what
was the actual application that generated the traffic [9]: for the
ground truth, an “oracle” is needed. Testing the classification
engine by means of artificial traffic (e.g., by generating traffic
in a testbed) solves the problem of knowing the ground truth
(you are the oracle), but reduces the representativeness of
the experiments, since synthetic traces are hardly represen-
tative of real world traffic. Assessing the performance against
traffic traces collected from operative networks is therefore
mandatory. To extract the ground truth from the real traces
we developed an ad-hoc oracle, based on DPI mechanisms,
and we manually tuned and checked whose results. However,
the oracle may still be fooled.
Classification accuracy is often reported in terms of False
Positive (FP) and True Positive (TP), and the False Negative
(FN) and True Negative (TN). A test is said “True” if the
classification result and the oracle are in agreement. A test is
said “False” on the contrary. The result of a test is “Positive”
if the classifier accepts the sample as belonging to the specific
class. On the contrary a test is “Negative”. For example,
consider a flow. The oracle states that this flow is an eMule
flow. If the flow is classified as an eMule flow, then we have a
True Positive. If not, then we have a False Negative. Consider
instead a flow which is not an eMule flow according to the
oracle. If the flow is classified as an eMule flow, then we have
a False Positive. If not, then we have a True Negative. Table I
summarizes the definitions.
The corresponding percentages must be evaluated as
• False Positive Percentage (%FP) is the percentage of
negative samples that were erroneously reported as being
positive:
%FP = 100
FP
Total Number of Negative Samples
;
3Fig. 1. Scheme of signature extraction process.
• False Negative percentage (%FN) the proportion of pos-
itive samples that were erroneously reported as negative:
%FN = 100
FN
Total Number of Positive Samples
;
• True Positive Percentage (%TP) is 100-%FN;
• True Negative Percentage (%TN) is 100-%FP;
Indeed, if there are 100 eMule flows and the classifier misses
10 of them, we have %FN=10% (%TP=90%). Similarly, if
there are 500 non eMule flows and the classifier returns all of
them as eMule, we have %FP=100% (%TN=0%).
Finally, results are often expressed by means of a Confusion
Matrix. In the field of artificial intelligence, a confusion matrix
is a visualization tool typically used in supervised learning.
Each column of the matrix represents the instances in a
predicted class, while each row represents the instances in an
actual class. One benefit of a confusion matrix is that it is easy
to see if the system is confusing two classes (i.e., commonly
mislabeling one as another).
III. KISS
A. Feature Extraction
A traditional DPI classifier inspects packet payload looking
for deterministic patterns, such as particular strings which are
compared to those in a signature database. The process of
defining the signatures is a complex task that requires a deep
knowledge of the protocols that need to be identified. As such,
any changes in a protocol can invalidate the signature, which
becomes outdated and must be redefined manually.
The goal of KISS is instead to automatically discover
application layer header format, without caring about specific
values of the header fields: we aim at automatically let the
protocol format emerge. Since UDP is a connectionless proto-
col, the first bytes of the payload of each UDP packet typically
contain an application layer protocol header whose fields can
be constant identifiers, counters, words from a small dictionary
(message/protocol type, flags, etc), or truly random values
(coming from encryption or compression algorithms). These
coarse classes of fields can be easily distinguished through a
simple statistical characterization of the values observed in a
sequence of packets.
The process of the format extraction is achieved by using
a simple Chi-Square like test. The test originally estimates
the goodness-of-fit between observed samples of a random
variable and a given theoretical distribution. Assume that the
possible outcomes of an experiment are K different values and
Ok are the empirical frequencies of the observed values, out
of C total observations (∑kOk = C). Let Ek be the number
of expected observations of k for the theoretical distribution
Ek = C · pk with pk the probability of value k. Given that C
is large, the distribution of the random variable
X =
K∑
k=1
(Ok − Ek)
2
Ek
(1)
that represents the distance between the observed empiri-
cal and theoretical distributions, can be approximated by a
Chi-Square, or χ2, distribution with K−1 degrees of freedom.
In the classical goodness of fit test, the values of X are
compared with the typical values of a Chi-Square distributed
random variable: the frequent occurrence of low probability
values is interpreted as an indication of a bad fitting. In KISS,
we build a similar experiment analyzing the content of groups
of bits taken from the packet payload we want to classify.
Chi-Square signatures are built from streams of packets. The
first N bytes of each packet payload are divided into G groups
of b consecutive bits each; a group g can take integer values
in [0, 2b − 1]. From packets of the same stream, we collect,
for each group g, the number of observations of each value
i ∈ [0, 2b − 1]; denote it by O(g)i . We then define a window
of C packets, in which we compute
Xg =
2b−1∑
i=0
(
O
(g)
i − E
(g)
i
)2
E
(g)
i
(2)
and collect them in the vector
X = [X1, X2, · · · , XG ] (3)
which is the KISS signature. Fig. 1 shows a schematic repre-
sentation of the KISS signature extraction.
One possibility to characterize a given protocol is to es-
timate the expected distribution {E(g)i } for each group g,
so that the set of signatures are created by describing the
expected distribution of the protocols of interest. During the
classification process then, the observed group g distribution
{O
(g)
i } must be compared to each of the {E
(g)
i } in the
database, for example using the Chi-square test to select the
most likely distribution. However, this process ends up in a
complex process in which Eq. (2) must be computed for each
protocol of interest.
In addition to the high complexity, the comparison with
reference distributions fails when the application protocol
includes constant values which are randomly extracted for each
flow. For example, consider a randomly extracted “flow ID”
in group g. Consider two flows, one used for training and one
for testing, generated by the same application. Let the training
flow packets take the value 12 in group g. Let the test flow
packets take instead the value 7 in the same group. Clearly,
the comparison of the two observed distributions does not pass
4the Chi-square test, and the test flow is not correctly classified
as using the same protocol as the training flow.
For the above motivations, we propose to simply check
the distance between the observed values and a reference
distribution, which we choose as the uniform distribution,
i.e., E(g)i = E = C2b . In the previous example, the group
randomness of the two flows has the same Xg values, that
identify a “constant” value, independently of the actual value.
In other terms, we use a Chi-Square like test to measure the
randomness of groups of bits or as an implicit estimate of the
source entropy.
To give the intuition of how Eq. (2) evolves versus C,
consider the case in which a deterministic group of bits is
observed. Since for a deterministic group only one value is
possible, the value of Xg becomes:
Xg =
2b−1∑
i=0
(
O
(g)
i − E
(g)
i
)2
E
(g)
i
(4)
=
2b−1∑
i=0
(O
(g)
i − E)
2
E
(5)
=
(C − E)2 +
(
2b − 1
)
E2
E
= C
(
2b − 1
) (6)
Thus, Xg linearly increases with C.
In general, for a block in which b0 bits are constant, it can
be shown that
Xg = C
(
2b0 − 1
)
+ 2b0χ2A (7)
where χ2A is the Chi-Square with A degrees of freedom. In
this case, A = 2b−b0 − 1.
To provide an example of the evolution of Xg , left plot in
Fig. 2 reports the value of two 4-bit long groups belonging
to two streams of two different traffic protocols, namely DNS
and eMule, versus the number of collected packets C. The
steep lines corresponding to groups taken from the eMule
stream refer to fields that are almost constants. In this case,
the longer the experiment is (larger C), the larger the distance
from the uniform distribution is, i.e., the bits are far from
being uniformly distributed. In the same plot, observe the
lines referring to DNS traffic. The lowest one has a very slow
increase with C, its behavior is almost perfectly random, the
values of X3 being compatible with those of a Chi-Square
distribution. The bouncing line, instead, corresponds to the
typical behavior of a counter. In fact, Eq. (2) over consecutive
bits of a counter, cyclically varies from very low values (when
all the values have been seen the same number of times) to
large values. The periodicity of this behavior depends on the
group position inside the counter.
While randomness provides a coarse classification over indi-
vidual groups, by jointly considering a set of G groups through
the vector X the fingerprint becomes extremely accurate. Ob-
serve right plot in Fig. 2. Each point in the figure corresponds
to a different stream. A window of C = 80 packets is used to
derive the signatures using the couple of features (X2, X3) as
coordinates. Points obtained from DNS streams are displaced
in the low left corner of the plot; points from eMule are spread
in the top part of the plot. Notice also that signatures of the
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Fig. 2. Evolution in time (left) and dispersions in space (right) of X of two
groups of 4 bits extracted from the second byte of UDP payloads.
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of KISS learning steps.
same protocol class are not identical. This is due to both the
behavior of each application and to different implementations
of the same protocol. For example, some eMule clients can be
downloading, uploading, or waiting, therefore exchanging dif-
ferent types of messages. Similarly, different implementations
of a DNS server can use different random number generators
to extract the query identifier. It is the scope of the decision
process to define the areas where points of the same protocols
are expected. Intuitively, different protocols fall in different
areas that are clearly identified and easily separable: a simple
straight horizontal line can effectively separate the two regions
considering this example. However, when several protocols are
considered, more complex surfaces have to be found.
B. Decision Process
KISS is based on supervised machine learning decision
process. During the training phase, we operate as sketched in
Fig. 3. We start by considering some streams that belong to
the set of applications we want to model. Streams are then fed
into a chunker, whose role is to derive the KISS signatures
as in Eq. (3). The signature set is randomly sampled by the
sampler, so as to select the training set, whose size will be
discussed in Sec. V-E. The training set is then fed to the
learning system, after which the KISS model is produced. In
this paper, we investigate two different learning systems, the
first based on Euclidean distance and the second based on
Support Vector Machines (SVM).
1) Euclidean Decision Process: A simple Euclidean dis-
tance is used for the decision process. A set of hyper-spheres,
one for each protocol, is identified to define the areas in which
5samples of each class are expected to fall. The classification
process is then straightforward: a point that falls inside a
sphere is classified according to the protocol associated to
that sphere, while a point that does not fall into any sphere is
assumed to be of an unknown protocol.
For a given class A, the representative hyper-sphere is fully
defined by its center X¯(A) and its radius ρ(A). X¯(A) is
simply computed, component by component, as the arithmetic
mean of each signature in the training set of class A. The
identification of the radius is more complex. Indeed, the
hyper-sphere should be big enough to include all the points
of the training, but it has to be small enough to avoid to
include samples of other classes. Using machine learning
terminology, one wants to maximize the True Positive ratio
while minimizing the False Positive ratio.
Formally, the following equation can be used to state the
problem:
ρ(A) = argmax
ρ
(
%TP (ρ)−%FP (ρ)
)
(8)
Recall that %TP (ρ) is computed considering samples of
class A, while %FP (ρ) is computed considering samples of
all other classes of the training set.
2) SVM Decision Process: SVM are a set of supervised
learning methods used for classification and regression. The
key idea of SVM is to displace the training samples (by means
of a transformation from the original N-dimensional space to a
possibly infinite-dimensional space) so that samples belonging
to different classes can be separated by the simplest surface,
i.e., an hyper-plane. SVMs exhibit a number of advantages:
• They are robust to the training set size and composition;
• Their computational and memory requirements are very
limited during the classification phase, even if the training
phase can be computationally expensive;
• They exhibit a very high discriminating power, so that
they typically achieve very high classification accuracy;
• There is a large number of efficient algorithms and
implementations already available. In particular, in this
paper we adopted the LIBSVM [10] implementation.
Finally, notice that the output of the SVM training phase
is a definition of a number of regions equal to the number of
classes defined during the training phase, e.g., one for each
protocol that is offered during the training phase. This implies
that a sample will then always be classified as belonging to
one of the known classes. Considering traffic classification,
an additional region is needed to classify all samples that do
not belong to any of the given protocols, i.e., to represent
unknown protocols. Thus, the training set must contain two
types of signatures: i) the ones referring to traffic generated
by the applications to classify; ii) the ones representing all the
remaining traffic. We refer to this second class as Background
since it represents the set of applications that we cannot
classify or are not interested in classifying.
IV. TESTING DATASET
We aim at assessing KISS performance in the most difficult
scenario, whenever possible. For most of the results we show,
we consider real traffic traces, collected from an operative,
totally uncontrolled network. In addition, to evaluate the per-
formance of KISS when dealing with new protocols, we also
selected, as a case study, P2P-TV applications. Indeed P2P-TV
systems have been recently introduced and they are starting
to became popular. These applications rely on proprietary
design and protocols, they preferentially use UDP as transport
protocol, and they are expected to offer a large amount of
traffic to the network; thus, their classification is going to be
the more and more important.
A. Classification Objects
We consider the scenario in which a network provider or
administrator is interested in knowing the traffic that is going
to or coming from a set of internal hosts. In this context, we
define a classification entity as
• flow if all packets are coming from the same source
IP address and UDP port and are going to the same
destination IP address and UDP port;
• endpoint if all packets having the same IP destination
(source) address and UDP destination (source) port.
Indeed, depending on the application, one can be interested in
identifying a single flow (as in the case of a VoIP stream), or
in detecting an endpoint and therefore all packets sent/received
from it (as in the case of a P2P application).
B. Testing Datasets
Real Traffic Traces: Real traffic traces (RealTrace) were col-
lected from the network of FastWeb [12], an ISP provider that
is the main broadband telecommunication company in Italy,
offering converged services, in which data, native VoIP [13]
and IPTV services share a single broadband connection. The
FastWeb network is a very heterogeneous scenario, in which
users are free to use the network without any restriction. It
therefore represents a very challenging scenario for traffic
classification. A probe node based on high-end PC running
Linux has been installed in a PoP located in Turin, in which
more than 500 users are connected, using more than 2000
different IP addresses (e.g., VoIP phones, set-top-boxes, PCs,
etc.). All packets entering/leaving the PoP have been captured.
The measurements presented in this paper refer to two datasets
that we call RealTrace-I and RealTrace-II, collected in 2006
and 2007 1.
Both traces contain many popular applications generating
UDP traffic, in particular we selected: i) eMule and Bittorrent,
ii) VoIP (over RTP) and iii) DNS protocols. Indeed, these
three protocols account for more than 80% of UDP endpoints,
corresponding to 95% of the flows and to more than 96% of
the total UDP volume. In the remaining traffic, nearly 2% of
flows are related to BitTorrent accounting for less than 1%
of bytes. Skype communications instead present the typical
mice/elephant behavior since a negligible number of flows
account for more than 1% of the total volume in both traces.
Being dated back to 2006 and 2007, no P2P-TV traffic is
present.
1Due to a NDA, we are not allowed to show results referring to more recent
traces. Nonetheless, we can affirm that this trace is representative of typical
KISS performance.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA TRACES
Bytes Packets Flows Endpnts Time period
RealTrace-I 53.13G 321M 18.25M 1.72M 22h, May ’06
RealTrace-II 31.33G 133M 5.25M 1.02M 12h, Jun ’07
P2Ptrace 10.25G 14M 132K 48.5K 3h, Apr ’08
Skype 3.7G 24.7M 966 559 96h, May ’06
P2P-TV Traces: To assess the performance of KISS with
P2P-TV traffic, we selected, among the available P2P-TV
applications, PPLive, Joost, SopCast and TVants. Since none
of the selected applications was available at the time of real
traffic trace collection, we are forced to rely on testbed P2P-
TV traces, called P2Ptrace, to assess the performance of KISS.
This dataset of traces has been collected in the context of
Napa-Wine [14] project, in which a large scale experiment was
organized to observe the performance of the above mentioned
P2P-TV applications. The resulting dataset consists of packet
level traces collected from more than 45 PCs running P2P-
TV applications in 5 different Countries, at 11 different
institutions. The dataset includes traces collected from PCs in
Campus LANs, Corporate networks with restrictive policies,
home ADSL connections, so that both nodes with public and
private IP addressing are present. We are therefore confident
that the heterogeneity of the P2Ptrace dataset is representative
of a wide range of different scenarios.
Skype Traces: In the tests, we also use the public avail-
able dataset for the Skype traffic [11]. The dataset contains
both Skype traffic identified in [2] and traces collected in a
controlled environment using PCs running different versions
of Skype and different operating systems such as Windows,
Linux and Pocket-PC.
Tab. II summarizes the previously described datasets and
reports the total amount of bytes, packets, flows and endpoints
for each dataset and the collection time and duration of each
trace.
We assume packets belonging to the same flow/endpoint
are exposed to the KISS engine, so that after digesting
C packets, a classification decision is taken and a new
observation window begins. Therefore, several classification
decisions are possibly taken for a single flow or endpoint.
In this paper, we consider independent classifications, so that
the same flow/endpoint can be classified differently at each
window. Notice that some reconciliation algorithm can be
easily designed to increase the accuracy of the classification
by considering the set of classifications involving the same
flow or endpoint, e.g., adopting a majority criterion. We leave
this issue to future work.
Notice that i) no assumption about observing the first set of
packets is stated; ii) there is no need to observe bidirectional
streams of packets; and iii) not all packets belonging to the
same flow/endpoint must be exposed to the classifier; possible
packet drop, reordering, sampling can be present.
C. The Oracle Definition
To obtain the ground truth from an Aggregated trace, i.e.
a traffic trace with a mixture of communications of different
protocols, we developed a DPI classifier that was explicitly
designed. It was implemented in Tstat [7], and its performance
were manually fine tuned and double checked. In particular,
DPI rules can be summarized as follow:
• DNS: we rely on simple port-based classification and
a manual inspection as to identify only the flows with
respect to DNS RFC1035;
• RTP/RTCP: we rely on the state machine described
in [13]. It combines a DPI signature and correlates the
value of the fields in consecutive packets (e.g., to check
the validity of the counters).
• eMule/BitTorrent: we developed a DPI classifier based
on [15], [16] adapting it to the considered scenario.
• Skype: we rely on the Bayesian framework described
in [2].
All the aggregated traffic that do not match any of the rules
is placed in a sub trace called Background since it represents
all the Unknown protocols.
Since the oracle itself can be unreliable, accurate manual
inspection and pinpointing of suspect cases are detailed in the
performance results.
V. RESULTS
A. Real Traffic Traces
We first report results considering a small subset of the
RealTrace-I dataset, corresponding to the first 1 hour of traffic.
The oracle is used to split the trace into 4 sub traces: each
sub trace includes only packets classified as belonging to
the same protocol, i.e., RTP, eMule, DNS and Background
traffic only. Each trace is fed to the KISS classifier, so that
signatures are evaluated. Both SVM and Euclidean decision
processes are trained using 300 signatures for each class and
the remaining signatures are used to assess the performance of
KISS. Recall that a signature is generated every C samples, so
that a flow/endpoint can be classified several times (i.e., every
C packets).
Tab. III summarizes the results. Each row corresponds to
a class of traffic according to the oracle. The second column
reports the total number of signatures extracted from each sub
trace while the remaining columns report the percentages of
True Positives and False Positives for both Euclidean and SVM
decision process.
The SVM results are astonishing: the True Positives are
always higher than 99% while False Positives are negligible.
The performance of the Euclidean classifier are more variable,
e.g., it performs very well for RTP but the accuracy decreases
when considering eMule and DNS protocols. This is related
to the adoption of an hyper-sphere as an approximation of
the separation surface between classes. To this extent, Fig. 4
reports Eq. (8) as an examples of optimization for RTP, eMule
and DNS. For RTP, any choice of ρ(RTP ) ∈ [12.2, 28.0]
allows to almost perfectly identify RTP traffic. On the contrary,
eMule class is not well represented by the hyper-sphere sur-
face, so that any choice of ρ(eMule) trades between %TP and
%FP. Similar reasoning applies for DNS traffic. This shows
that a simple decision process based on Euclidean distance is
hard to design, while the adoption of SVM allows to avoid
7TABLE III
EUCLIDEAN AND SVM PERFORMANCE ON REALTRAFFIC TRACES
Euclidean SVM
Tot. %TP %FP %TP %FP
RTP 8386 99.9 - 99.9 -
eMule 1527 84.3 0.12 99.3 -
DNS 8245 91.3 - 99.9 0.01
Backg 2579 99.1 5.31 99.6 0.15
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Fig. 4. Euclidean Decision Process: True Positive - False Positive evolution
of versus ρ for RTP, eMule and DNS classes.
this problem. This conclusion is supported by other tests we
performed, not reported here for the sake of brevity. Therefore,
in the following we will consider only the SVM classifier and
we will investigate how KISS performance are affected by
parameters setting and different scenarios.
B. P2P-TV traffic traces
To prove the KISS flexibility, we explore its ability to
identify traffic generated by P2P-TV applications. The design
and engineering of a DPI mechanism for proprietary and
closed P2P-TV applications would be daunting and extremely
expensive. On the contrary, training KISS is quite straightfor-
ward: a packet trace is captured by simply running the target
application and then it is used to train the SVM. RealTrace-I
instead is used as Background class. In this way, all traces
from the P2Ptrace dataset are used to evaluate %TP while
RealTrace-I is instead used to evaluate the %FP, since we
assume no P2P-TV traffic could be present during 2006. The
total amount of time required to complete this task is less than
6 hours.
Results are summarized in Tab. IV, which reports percent-
ages computed over more that 1.2 millions of tests. Labels
on the rows represents the ground truth. Also in this case,
results are amazing. KISS is able to correctly classify more
than 98.1% of samples as True Positives in the worst case and
only 0.3% of False Positives are present.
C. Signature Robustness
We are first interested in quantifying KISS robustness
respect to a training set independent from the test set. We thus
perform an experiment in which the SVM is trained using
samples extracted from the initial part of the RealTrace-I.
A 9-hour long subset of RealTrace-I is considered, but the
TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX CONSIDERING P2P-TV APPLICATIONS
Tot. Joost PPLive SopCast TVants Aggr.
Joost 33514 98.1 - - - 1.9
PPLive 84452 - 100.0 - - -
SopCast 84473 - - 99.9 - 0.1
TVants 27184 - - - 100.0 -
Aggr. 1.2M 0.3 - - - 99.7
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Fig. 5. False Positive percentage variation versus time. Background in the
training set.
training set includes samples extracted from the first 30
minutes only. As in experiment V-A, only RTP, eMule, DNS
and Background are considered in the SVM model. Results are
reported in Fig. 5 showing only Background False Positive
percentages since the %TP is always higher than 99%. The
plot confirms the intuition that the characterization of the
Background traffic may be a problem, since there are peaks
that clearly show that the SVM is fooled by the sudden
appearance of unknown protocols that were not included in
the training set.
Investigating further, we notice that the high percentage of
Background traffic classified as RTP traffic is due a single
endpoint which is receiving traffic with the same “format”
of RTP protocol. However, the DPI based oracle did not
classify this endpoint as RTP, since a mismatch in the RTP
header is present: the RTP version field takes a values of 1
instead of 2. Apart from this difference, all other fields are
in perfect agreement with the RTP standard as in RFC3550.
Moreover, all packets received by this endpoint have 172B
of UDP payload, which is typical of VoIP streams using the
ITU-T G.711 encoder [13] used in the FastWeb network. We
then claim that this is an actual RTP flow, but the DPI oracle
was fooled by the wrong version value. On the contrary, KISS
correctly classifies this flow as a RTP flow.
Similarly, investigating the samples that are misclassified
as DNS (e.g., from 15:30 to 16:00) we notice that a single
endpoint (listening to UDP port number 9940) is the only
responsible for this behavior. We manually inspected this
traffic and verified that it cannot be a DNS endpoint, so that
the oracle is reliable. Interestingly, no sample of this endpoint
is included in the training set of Background traffic. Since
the SVM is always forced to classify the sample as one of
the possible classes, it resolves to classify it as DNS rather
than Background. Considering this endpoint only, Fig. 6 shows
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Fig. 7. False Positive percentage variation versus time. Aggregate in the
training set.
the probability that the SVM evaluates it as a Background or
DNS sample versus time. It can be seen that some uncertainty
is present. Repeating the experiment by including some of
these endpoint signatures in the Background training set, KISS
correctly classifies it. This is an example of “under-training”
of SVM.
Similar conclusions can be drawn investigating the eMule
False Positives. They all correspond to endpoints listening to
UDP port number 3074, possibly related to the Xbox-Live
protocol, which is sometimes confused by the SVM as eMule
traffic, since the SVM is “under-trained”. Also in this case, by
adding some samples of these endpoints to the training set, no
FP is detected.
We can conclude that KISS shows excellent performance,
since in all cases the True Positive percentages are higher
than 99%. The training of the SVM is robust considering
the signature of known protocols, but it can suffer when
the Background training set is small or does not include
all protocols that may be present in the considered network
scenario. This leaves room for improving the performance of
KISS by carefully selecting the training set samples. Notice
that the accuracy of any supervised machine learning decision
process is strongly affected by the coverage and accuracy of
the training set. Intuitively, a limited or outdated training set
performs worse than an updated one. A discussion of the
training set size and its impact on performance is presented in
Sec. V.
D. Training with the Aggregate
A possible weakness of KISS is that the SVM must be
trained with the Background traffic, i.e., with actual traffic ex-
tracted from the network the classifier is used representing the
Unknown protocols. While the adoption of actual traffic does
not pose particular issues, the extraction of “pure” Background
is very questionable. A possible solution to this issue is to use,
during the SVM learning phase, the whole Aggregate of traffic
as Unknown traffic. This poses some problems, since samples
of a given class may be part of the Aggregate traffic as well.
Fig. 7 shows results obtained by running KISS in the
scenario previously described, but using the Aggregate trace
to train the SVM for the Unknown traffic. Also in this case the
True Positive percentage remains higher than 99% (results are
not plotted for the sake of brevity). Considering FP, apart from
the RTP endpoint that the oracle misclassifies, we observe
an increased percentage of samples being classified as eMule
(with an average %FP=4.5%). Nonetheless, results remain
very good.
E. Training set size
Similarly, it is interesting to observe how performance
changes with training sets of different size. Results are plotted
in Fig. 8, which reports the %TP and %FP for increasing
training set size with confidence intervals evaluated over 10
independent tests and accuracy α = 0.5. The plot shows
that KISS classifies RTP, DNS and eMule correctly starting
from a training set size of only 25 samples (worst case is
%TP>91.73% for DNS) but at least 75 samples are needed
to obtain excellent results. Also in this case, the correct
classification of the Background traffic is more problematic,
since the False Positive percentage is smaller than 5% only
when the training set comprises at least 200 samples. The
intuition behind this is that the Background traffic is far more
heterogeneous with respect to traffic of a given protocol and a
larger number of samples are required to accurately describe
it.
F. Training with many classes
All the results reported so far consider only 3 or 4 pro-
tocols. It is interesting to analyze the performance of the
classifier with a larger number of target protocols. Using
RealTrace-II, P2P-TV testbed and the Skype datasets we create
a KISS model including nine different classes, plus one for
the Background traffic. Each class has been characterized
with 300 signatures randomly chosen from the initial portion
of each trace. Tab. V reports the confusion matrix of the
classification result. As before, labels on the rows represents
the ground truth. The first column reports the total number
of signature, while the other columns show the agreement
between the ground truth and KISS classification. Again,
results are impressive: KISS always achieves more than 99%
of True Positives, with less than 10% of False Positives from
the background class. Further analysis revealed that 7.59%
of the false eMule samples are related to a single endpoint,
which generates lots of short flows directed to an high number
95
20
40
60
80
95100
5 25 50 75100 150 200 300 400 500
%
Training set size
%TP RTP
%TP eMule
%TP DNS
%FP
Fig. 8. Classification accuracy versus training set size.
510
20
30
40
60
80
95100
16 32 48 64 80 96 112
%
C [packets]
%TP RTP
%TP eMule
%TP DNS
%FP
Fig. 9. Classification accuracy versus signature packet window C.
of different destinations. Unfortunately, we were not able to
identify which actual protocol was used. After the adding
of some samples of this endpoint in the background training
set, all eMule False Positives disappeared. For what concern
the 2.67% of samples identified as RTP, more than the 90%
of them is generated by only two endpoints that use a RTP
protocol with wrong version number as previously discussed
in Sec. V-C.
G. Parameter Selection And Tuning
The signature creation approach previously presented is
based on a number of parameters whose setting may be
critical. These are the criteria we used to set them:
Bits per group, b = 4. The choice of b should trade-off two
opposite needs. On the one hand, we would like b to be the
closest as possible to typical length of protocol fields; since
protocols dialogs are usually based on words whose length
is multiple of the byte or, sometimes, is half of a byte, b
should be 4 or 8 or a multiple of 8. On the other hand, b
should be small enough to allow that the packet window C
over which the Chi-Square test is statistically significant is not
too large. Beside, in this case streams can be classified even
if they are not too long, they are classified in short time and
live classification is possible. Thus, we chose b = 4.
Number of bytes per packet, N = 12. In general, clas-
sification accuracy increases with the number of considered
bytes per packet. However, complexity of the classification
tool increases also with N , in terms of both memory and com-
putational complexity: as a convenient trade-off, we choose
N = 12. Given b = 4 this values corresponds to G = 24
groups. Another reason to choose N = 12 bytes is that, this
way, we collect 20 bytes of the IP packet payload (12 bytes
+ 8 bytes of the UDP header) that is the minimum size of the
TCP header and the typical value used by measurement tools.
Notice that the optimal value of N depends on the targeted
applications. For example, DNS and eMule can be clearly
identified by only considering (X2, X3) as early showed
in Fig. 2. However, when considering different protocols,
possibly more and different groups must be considered. The
selection of which is the best set of groups to include in the
signature X is then a complex task that is left out as future
work.
Packet window, C = 80. While we would like to keep the
packet window as small as possible, the estimation of the ob-
served distribution is considered to be statistically significant
if the number of samples for each value is at least 5. Having
chosen b = 4, in order to have Ei = C/2b equal to 5, we
need C to be equal to about 80.
However, since in KISS we are not performing a real Chi-
square test, we are interested in the impact of smaller values of
C, which would allow an earlier classification. Fig. 9 reports
the True Positive percentages of well-known protocols and
the False Positive percentages, without distinguishing among
protocols. Confidence intervals with an accuracy α = 0.5 are
evaluated over 250 different sub-traces from RealTrace-I, each
comprising more than 100 samples. The Figure clearly shows
that the %TP is almost not affected by the number of samples
that are considered to evaluate the observed frequencies in
Eq. (1). Indeed, the format of the considered protocols is very
different and the SVM has little problem in distinguishing
them even if C is small. However, the %FP is much more
sensitive to C, and only for C > 80 it goes below 5%.
H. Coverage
The packet window size C plays an important role in KISS
design and it may affect the applicability of KISS. Indeed,
given the connectionless characteristic of UDP, one expects
that UDP flows and endpoints last for few packets. Fig. 10
confirms this intuition reporting the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of flow length for both flow/endpoint pack-
ets and bytes. All incoming UDP traffic in RealTrace-I is
considered to derive the CDF. The left plot clearly shows
that 40% of flows and endpoints has only 1 packet, while
only 0.2% of flows and 5% of endpoints have at least 80
packets. However, these flows/endpoints respectively account
for more than 93.8% and 98.6% of the bytes carried by UDP,
as reported in the right plot. This clearly shows that, while
KISS is not suitable for the classification of short lived UDP
flows/endpoints, it can however successfully target the small
fraction of them that generate the majority of the traffic, i.e.,
long-lived flows.
I. Complexity
KISS has limited computational complexity. In terms of
memory, 2b counters are needed per group, giving a total of
G · 2b counters for each tracked stream. Considering bytewise
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TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX CONSIDERING P2P-TV, REAL-TRACES AND SKYPE TRAFFIC
Tot. BitTorrent eMule RTCP RTP DNS Skype SopCast TVAnts PPLive Backg
BitTorrent 1268 100 - - - - - - - - -
eMule 57255 0.02 99.15 - - 0.03 - - - - 0.80
RTCP 2407 - - 99.96 - - - - - - 0.04
RTP 585647 - - - 99.79 - - - - - 0.21
DNS 2707 0.46 - - - 99.54 - - - - -
Skype 46600 - - - - - 99.61 - - - 0.39
Sopcast 83460 - - - - - - 99.95 - - 0.05
TVAnts 25748 - - - - - - - 99.69 - 0.73
PPLive 27278 - - - - - - - - 99.24 0.76
Backg 84273 0.27 7.59 - 2.67 0.22 - - - - 89.25
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Fig. 10. CDF of the flow/endpoints length in packets (on the left), and bytes
(on the right). The vertical line is in correspondence of 80 packets.
counters, G = 24 and b = 4, 384 Bytes are required for each
flow, i.e., a Gigabyte of memory allows to track more than
2.7M of streams.
The computation complexity of updating a X signature
involves G = 24 increments for each packet. Once every
C = 80 packets, the signature is computed. The cost of this
computation is O(G · 2b) multiplications, see Eq. (2).
The computational complexity of the SVM decision cor-
responds to some products between vectors, i.e., it has a
complexity of O(G ·M) multiplications, being M the number
of classes. Using the LIBSVM library it takes around 100 µs
to classify a signature from empirical measurements on an
Linux system with an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 T8300@2.40GHz.
Considering a single UDP flow, KISS can roughly classify
8·105 packets/s; thus, on-line classification is possible for a
256Mbps stream of minimum-size UDP packets, even with
no code optimization or parallelization.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since Port-based classification [1] has become unreliable,
a number of different solutions and methodologies have been
proposed to classify Internet Traffic [4], [5], [9], [17], [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]. Classification engines
can be coarsely divided into three categories, each of them
exploiting different ideas. For a good survey see [8] while
[26] is a complementary work for the survey.
Payload-based techniques [9], [18], [19], [20] inspect the
content of packets looking for distinctive signatures that allow
to recognize a given application. All DPI techniques fall in
this class.
Machine-learning-based classification [5], [21], [22], [23],
[27], [28] rely on the rationale that, since the nature of
the services is extremely diverse (e.g., Web vs VoIP), the
corresponding generated traffic is very diverse as well (e.g.,
short-lived bursts of big packets versus long-lived, constant
bitrate flows of small packets). This class of work stems
from the characterization and modeling research field, which
started from pioneering work [29]. Initial work in this area
focused on the offline traffic classification, exploring which
flow properties and which classification technique was best
suited to discriminate traffic flows according to the different
classes of applications [5], [21], [22], [23]. More recently,
[27], [28] addressed the problem of “early” classification of
individual applications, basing solely on information such as
the size, direction (and inter-packet gap in case of [28]) of the
very first packets of each flow: the initial handshake phase of
different applications is distinctive and can be used as protocol
fingerprint (e.g., SMTP handshake is different from HTTP
one).
Finally, Behavioral-based classification [4], [24], [25] tar-
get the classification of Internet hosts on the sole basis of the
transport layer traffic patterns they generate (e.g., P2P hosts
contacts many different hosts typically using a single port,
whereas a Web server is contacted by different clients with
multiple parallel connections).
Our work aims at fine-grained classification of Internet
traffic. As such, we consider work targeted to host identifi-
cation [4], [24], [25] or to coarse-grained identification [5],
[21], [22] to be not suited as a comparison for our purpose.
Moreover, this work aims at filling a gap in the current Internet
classification spectrum, specifically addressing UDP traffic
classification. Since UDP is a connectionless protocol, we
argue that approach such as [27], [28] cannot be applied as
no handshake can be reliably identified in this case. Indeed,
even the notion of “flow” is fuzzy considering UDP streams.
Works closest to ours are those that belong to the payload-
based class. However, our work is very different from [9],
[18], since the definition of application signatures does not
rely on any reverse engineering of the applications. Instead,
our approach is more similar in spirit to [19], [20], in which
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authors automate the extraction of signatures from the appli-
cation payload. Both [19], [20] rely on signatures extracted
from the beginning of each data stream (more specifically,
the first 64–256 bytes). We remove this assumption, so that
the classification can start at any point in a flow. This is an
important difference, since, for example, it opens the door to
adopt packet sampling to cope with the ever increasing link
data rate.
Another significant difference consists in the technique
used to express the payload fingerprint:[19] uses discrete byte
encoding, whereas the framework of [20] proposes the use of
different models of increasing complexity. Another difference
consists in the technique explored to perform the classification:
indeed, in this work we use Support Vector Machines (SVM)
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been deeply
tested in the context Internet traffic classification.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented KISS, a novel classifier explicitly targeting
UDP traffic that couples the stochastic description of applica-
tion protocols with the discrimination power of Support Vector
Machines. Signatures are extracted from a traffic stream by the
means of Chi-square like test that allows application protocol
format to emerge, while ignoring protocol synchronization and
semantic rules. A decision process based on Support Vector
Machine is then used to classify the extracted signatures,
leading to exceptional performance.
Performance of KISS has been tested in different scenarios,
considering both data, VoIP, traditional P2P applications and
novel P2PTV systems. Results are astonishing. The average
True Positive percentage is 99.6% and less than 1% of False
Positives are typically detected. Moreover, KISS is very robust
to internal parameter setting and it is efficient both considering
memory and computational requirements.
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